Diverting Valve Layout

Accident at Three Mile Island, again, most likely sabotage government

3) A government investigation slightly lighter and slightly as oriented edges


a) almost immediate conclusions on the absence of sabotage

As for Chernobyl in Russia, government committees in charge of studying the problem have concluded very quickly technical failure and dismissed just as quickly the theory of sabotage.

four days after the accident, the FBI had already announced that the hypothesis of sabotage was ruled out and that the investigation was closed.

April 6 or 7 days after the accident, the FBI sent a telegram encrypted Cabinet Crisis of the White House saying that the sabotage was not the cause of the accident, as the member of the NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) Harold Denton. As noted, there was no reasonable argument can lead to this conclusion Denton. The telegram is now in the National Archives is marked "Encrypted transmission for reasons only." Bits of this message are masked in black ink, then it is considered "unclassified", which can mean "unclassified" or "untreated." But whether one or the other, it means that it still should not have these shots of black felt.

On August 7, the Presidential Commission asked the FBI to determine the possibility of an investigation regarding the circumstances surrounding the closing of valves demineralisers. The presidential commission had the authority to request assistance to any state agency, and by vote, decided she needed the FBI. The FBI got in touch very quickly. But the NRC informed them that human error and equipment failure were the cause of the accident, and therefore an investigation was unnecessary.

be recalled that in aviation accidents, we will find downright tiny pieces Cabin on the seabed, and then reconstructs the plane, and is sought for years what has been causing the problem. There, then it is a national security problem, we know from the outset what caused the problem.

It's like what happened to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The U.S. government knew that Al Qaeda was responsible for the attacks even after half a day.

So it is clear that we wanted to eliminate any possibility of investigation and bury the affair as quickly as possible, retaining only the theory of the accident. Inevitably, since it was the government U.S. responsible for the sabotage. That he was not going to steer the investigation in this direction.


b) On the analysis of various technical problems occurred during the accident

On the problem of the valves of the secondary circuit of relief that had been closed and not reopened (and which one of LED light was hidden by label maintenance), the internal investigation did not consider the possibility of intentional closure. In addition, the NRC considered that it would take too much effort to interview the 750 people who had access to these valves. And finally, the NRC has never discovered the cause of this problem. As great investigation.

can not say they are the least bit suspicious. There is a hyper suspicious event. But they do not consider the possibility of sabotage. Well yes, obviously, since they were in cahoots. The

August 15, the presidential commission asked NASA to conduct an inspection system demineralisers. The plant managers had not even technical drawings of the equipment required for a proper inspection. NRC inspectors how could they do a decent job without these drawings? Well they could not do so simply.

Regarding the original problem of blocking valves demineralisers one of the secondary circuit, the NRC has speculated on the cause of that case: namely, that the water supply system was connected to the system pressurized air. Only when performing an experiment on demineralisers to test the hypothesis, they were unable to obtain the expected result. But despite the failure of their experience, they did not seek another possible reason the pumps stop. And they were not worried about not knowing the underlying cause of the problem.

When Airbus crash, for offending society, it is never the fault of the hardware, but almost always the pilot's. Ditto when a giant oil tanker sank on its oil and spread around scores. While there, the operators are responsible for anything. In general, companies tend to refuse to admit their responsibility in an accident. Or when there is an administration officials do not want the accident falls on their backs and defaulting to their subordinates. But here, no problem, they admit that the plant at full blast messing.

Moreover, a priori, as already mentioned above, we did not interview officials from the control center to find out what they thought of different times of disaster. It was just simply the fact that the alarms sounded from everywhere and it had not helped. Very light anyway. In any survey of this kind, usually, we try to determine exactly how the operators understood the situation during different times of disaster. Operators are asked why they did not understand the situation, and if they do not think, in retrospect, they could have done better if they did not make a mistake at a time to another. For pilots of aircraft, it's always like this. But here, no one is satisfied simply because the alarms were submerged.


c) investigators untrained and delays in the investigation

In June 1979, the NRC, through a group review of the investigation, acknowledged that his investigators had no training in investigative techniques, or knowledge of ways to find evidence or criminal investigation procedures. The NRC also wanted to believe they had no authority to compel people to take evidence under oath, when in fact they had.

The report also said that:

" An experienced inspector should have been recruited with the initial inspection team to collect evidence (notes, checklists, etc. ...), which were lost during the first days after the accident .

In addition, the review group found that NRC's investigation was hampered by the delay in receiving transcripts of interviews with workers.
It should be noted that investigators still investigating belonging to the Office of Inspection and the Implementation of the instructions, did not arrive at the station only 2 weeks after the accident. All the time it took to make them disappear incriminating evidence.

Yes, it sure the government did not really want to investigate, since it was he who was behind the "accident".

Conclusion: we can see, the government has been very light in conducting the survey and the explanations about "the accident" (normal, since he has made sabotage). But it is on at the time, with the mass media, there really was not worried. You could throw any version completely bogus, it went smoothly. They never imagined that there would one day be a thing called the Internet that allow skeptics to come and say that none of it does makes sense.


b) The report Rogovin

Mitchell Rogovin, a lawyer for wealthy clients (he was hired first at Arnold & Porter, where he became partner. Then he founded his own firm of lawyers: Rogovin, Stern & ; Huge) and also former Deputy Prosecutor General of the Government and Chief Counsel of the IRS (Internal Revenue Service) in the 60s, then special adviser to the CIA (in 75/76), is a person hired by the NRC to conduct the investigation the accident.

3 years later, in 1982, released the report Rogovin. Coincidentally, it clears the operators responsible for the accident and it involved mostly organizational issues and the flood of alarms. The report cites a number of factors beyond the control of operators involved in human error:

"The inadequate training, poor procedures, lack of skill in the diagnosis of the group's share of site management, instrumentation misleading, deficiencies of the facility, and a poorly designed control room. For these faults, industry and the NRC must share responsibility with M and Ed

"... The operators at TMI in the early morning of March 28 were faced instrumentation misleading, parameters of reactors they had never been trained to understand and procedures offered no useful assistance. "

course, the purpose of this report was to clear the 6 traitors. Rogovin and was certainly one too.


4) revelations and coincidences ladles


a) The only two anomalies found by the NRC

Coincidentally, the NRC finds nothing at all weird, where everything is extremely suspicious. And the only mistake he finds, guides, again coincidentally, fortunately to a thesis very well calculated to turn people away from the truth.

few days before the accident, a surprise inspection of the NRC concerning the protection of the plant has led to the discovery of violations of access control, while the previous inspections, which had been announced, did not find anything tel. Moreover, at the time of the accident, TMI plant was not obliged to use the new rule of "two men", which should prevent a nobody is left alone in a vital area. The plant was also not updated for other new security measures.

These "revelations" about the security flaws, in that the sabotage was carried out by government agents, are actually intended to give weight to the argument of possible terrorist plot. This is information given to believe that we could enter the plant as in a mill and walk around where we wanted, so to pretend it was not a problem for terrorists to enter into that Central. While

is absolutely false. Already, one can not enter as they please at a power plant (there are few entries, and all are heavily monitored), which invalidates the possibility of a terrorist infiltration without staff. And we certainly can not get hired so easily, without any investigation on the person.

Especially because, in the case of a terrorist infiltration with some employees of the plant would have vanished into the wild immediately after the accident. And, given that the administration must keep pictures of staff, they were quickly identified. However, a priori, it is not the case. We never had a revelation like what terrorists had infiltrated the staff.

The problem for the U.S. government is that if the conspiracy theory of terrorism is disqualified, and if you doubt the official account, we head straight to the conspiracy theory of government. Hence the attempt to steer people toward the suspicious terrorist conspiracy theory, while keeping a big blur on the subject, given the limited credibility of the case and given the original intent to favor the theory of accident.

All this may have been made to have a plan B in case a large amount of people would put not to believe the official version of the accident. But it is more likely that these beginnings of information were left bound for the most suspicious people, to guide them towards a red herring. This is the principle of gatekeepers.

Note also, that just happened unexpectedly this survey about the seriousness of access controls was made by the NRC itself, and this a few days before the disaster. Yep, it was a surprise inspection shortly before the disaster. A similar control, leading to the same conclusions that would have made six months before the terrorist conspiracy theory less easy to defend, because it would lead to the reinforcement of security.

So there, in retrospect, one might even say they were a little too much, they are a little too revealing. Because the four elements: the negative results of this unannounced inspection, the fact that it is a surprise inspection while there had apparently not been for a long time that it was made just before the disaster, and that it was made by the NRC itself, are a bit too good to be true. They may have thought this little manipulation would never detected.

Another "anomaly" revealed. The presidential commission has obtained an internal memo from the Central IMT, which was written 10 months before the accident, saying "it's time to really do something about this problem before a serious accident occurs . If polishers (the demineralisers) fail for themselves when the plant is near its full capacity, the resulting damage could be very important. "

Again, there is fortunately a memo accusing the element that will be supposedly the cause of the accident. Again, luck is a little too good. So, again, we can think we invented the memo (Or is that the well established 10 months before) to justify after the fact "the accident".


b) In the same vein, a newspaper warning about the low level of plant safety

few months after the accident, a journalist with "The Guide", a Robert Kapler, a warning about the low level of security inside the plant. He managed to get hired as a security guard. Then he managed to walk alone in strategic locations in the plant.

The goal is the same as for the "revelations" of the NRC. It a ruse to divert the minds of people suspicious of the idea that the sabotage came from within, from people in the plant. This guide them towards the idea of a terrorist plot. Perhaps also the instigators of the plot have said that the history of the NRC unannounced just before the disaster would appear suspicious, or is insufficient, and wanted to increase the credibility and weight by adding this history of infiltration by a journalist.

journalist who managed to get himself appointed safety officer should be part of the operation to believe that anyone can get hired at a nuclear plant (And therefore a terrorist). The fact that it was taken as a security guard had to be arranged.


c) Hollywood released a film of anti-nuclear at the same time just

15 days before the disaster at Three Mile Island was released a film called "The China Syndrome" starring Jane Fonda and Michael Douglas. It tells the story of an incident from a nuclear plant. This incident can lead to melt the heart of the reactor, as what happened at Three Mile Island. Here is a synopsis of the film, found on Wikipedia:

Kimberley Wells, a journalist on television, films during a documentary Incident at nuclear plant at Point Conception. His cameraman shows a nuclear engineer. In a nuclear power plant, following the runaway nuclear reaction, the heart may melt, fall into the tank, then to attack it and then begin its journey through the Earth, it cross - as if he was coming to China, hence the name.

The topic of the film of interest is that the plant has fundamental flaws that may lead to a disaster at any time. Something to scare ordinary people, enough paranoia to properly maintain the energy Nuclear.

course, in the film, the government seeks to hide the dangers of the plant to the people. That way, when in reality, a government official or a specialist on nuclear energy trying to defend this, people influenced by the film will tend not to believe them. And it's not a matter of propaganda that has been used in this film. It is found regularly in newspapers or in the movies for years.

The output of this film just before the catastrophe is obviously no coincidence. The film was released to increase the impact of the "accident" at Three Mile Island in the collective imagination.

But then, with the mass media kings, and controlled by the clique that rules the world, in the absence of alternative information, like all journalists favored the thesis that leaving this movie just before the disaster was an incredible coincidence, everyone has believed.

In addition, as is the kind of information that passes quickly in newspapers before being replaced by another, people do not have time to think about the problem. And unless they are on their guard, they accept the information without thinking about it. Magma daily news prevents reflection really different to the problems presented, if we do not allow that knowledge from the start to doubt the information. The use of emotional supports also the absence of reflection.


5) The motive for the sabotage

Why the U.S. government would do such a thing? Well, as for the Russian government about Chernobyl, just to put a halt to development of nuclear power in the world. As already mentioned in other sections, nuclear energy is a good market that allows a state to be energy independent For years, see for decades with the introduction of fast breeder reactor plants. And that's bad when one wants to control the country. While with the hydrocarbons (gas, oil, coal), one can easily turn off the tap in case of rebellion within a country.

Indeed, as in Chernobyl, this is not the U.S. government itself is behind the coup, but the clique that rules the world.

The plot against nuclear energy was in two shots: Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. Three Mile Island gave a severe blow to the development of nuclear power in the world. Chernobyl and gave the coup de grace. Before

sabotage at Three Mile Island, 70% of Americans were for civil nuclear power. Just after the "accident", it was more than 50% (if the survey is not bogus of course).

But people's opinions, that's not all. It takes the media, whose power weighed heavily in the balance. One could say that it has a minimum for a correction of the view of + or - 20%. So with the media at first subtly, then more and more openly anti-nuclear, when we were 70/30 in the opinion, it was actually rather 50/50. And then when we took the 50/50, it was instead of 30/70. It must also take account of motivation in both camps. If one side, there are no longer just for people, good composition and good liver and other people who have the bit between his teeth, which are very motivated against nuclear power, ready to be in bad times for the cause, it does not have the same strength. So we can still reduce the ratio of real power.

That said, maybe the polls are cans. But whatever. These people only need to have a pretext to present to public opinion. So, true or not true, the excuse was there. And then they could stop the nuclear program peacefully. It's like weapons of mass destruction that the U.S. government has put forward to attack Iraq in 2003. It was clear from the outset they did not exist. But whatever. Is to have an excuse to present to public opinion was important, as fallacious as it is.

Then, during the early '80s, the development of civilian nuclear power has undergone a sharp slowdown in the world. Then in the late 80s, after Chernobyl, it was almost completely stopped.


6) What's really happening

Apparently, that night, there were only 3 people in the control room: William Zewe (in some documents it was Bill instead of William), the supervisor, and 2 operators and Edward Frederick Craig Faust . Incidentally, they had all three of the army. A central

2 reactors, an average 600 people who work there. But most of the performers. Everything is decided in the control room for the essentials. So, just as some people working in the control room are traitors, and 3 or 4 technicians working in the field. The traitors in the field have only trigger first big failure, so that later, everything goes from the control room. If there are honest people on the staff of the control room, you can also send them to conduct audits in the plant to keep them away.

So, a priori, that's how it happened. At least 6 people were traitors. The two operators who have sabotaged demineralisers valves and injection safety, foreman Fred Sheimann; and 3 operators in the control room (Bill Zewe supervisor, and Craig and Edward Frederick Faust).

At 4 hours, two technicians working on demineralisers sabotage them. Detail, there was a party held with the staff just at that time (almost to the minute) to celebrate the first year of operation of the plant. Probably the saboteurs took the opportunity to remove some people where going to pass the initial sabotage. Then, the operators of the control room take over to continue the sabotage. They had previously sabotaged the discharge valve so that it can not heal. The two operators who had looked after the plumbing valves closed circuit water injection safety in the secondary circuit. And they also put a label maintenance to mask the signal for closing the valve in question, to justify that they did not see during the "accident". Maybe the software has simply been sabotaged so that certain elements are defective. Moreover, as noted, few minutes after the start of the "accident", they turned off the water injection automatic safety.

They were so easy to play those who do not understand what was happening, and let the water escape slowly from the primary circuit. They waited quietly for three hours as it is emptied of its water and the heart partly based. They played as fools for all the indicators that might make them realize what was happening. For example, they could see perfectly well that in reality the pressure gauge indicated that it decreased. And alerts to radioactivity should work perfectly.

They have erased all traces of their lies about the indicators by purging the memory of the printer. And then, once the heart sufficiently damaged, and once dropped radioactive steam outside the plant, they presented the heart under water. The objective was achieved. Then, the official commission of inquiry was charged to bury the case quickly done well. Everything was done overnight, so that there is the least possible reactions.

That said, perhaps in reality, none of this has happened, and everything was bogus to pretend that such a thing happened. At the moment there is conspiracy, the conspirators have mastered and where the mass media to 100%, everything can be suspect.

3d Department Extreme

3 Accident at Three Mile Island, again, most likely sabotage government 2

2) Criticism of the official version


A) The list of technical problems or human

was therefore an accumulation of problems 20 technical or human.

1) The water system is connected to the air stream, which causes the water enters the air stream, closes the valves connecting the demineralisers the secondary circuit and thus leads to the pumps stop the secondary circuit.

2) The fact that blockade of the secondary circuit due to valves demineralisers had been expected, and a system to prevent their closure installed, but had never been connected.

3) the fact that the inlet valves of the emergency circuit secondary have remained closed due to a 42h before testing. While procedure indicates that they must be immediately reopened.

4) An indicator indicating the closure of these valves is covered with a label maintenance, preventing operators realize the closure.

5) The fact that operators are not able to see that the indicator opening / closing the valves is hidden by a label maintenance.

6) Operators who do not see the indicator on the second valve, which is not hidden by a label. And this, for 42h!

7) The presence of the two previous problems when one of the first things to check in the check-list of operators in the control room is the flow of emergency circuit through the indicators in question.

8) The design of the ill-conceived pass circuit in the secondary circuit, which makes the vacuum pump stops almost immediately, so that the water must come out directly into the atmosphere.

9) the discharge valve of the primary circuit which remains open when it should have been close.

10) Deactivation by the operators of automatic water injection in the primary circuit. So that water loss due to the discharge valve remained open was not could be compensated.

11) the indicator on the valve that indicates that the fact that the closure order was given, but not if the valve is open or closed (and therefore if the closure order was executed with success). This time it is known that the discharge valve has an average of only 40 successes before knowing failure of closure.

12) indicator of water level in the primary circuit which in some cases, still probably quite common, do not give the right pressure, so called because of a phenomenon that would make the water via complex movements with steam, deceive indicator, thus believing that the water level is correct (or even at maximum) while this is not the case. It is true that we thought was enough, because the valve was supposed to open only rarely (the same valve on Unit 1 at Three Mile Island had never been open, except during tests) . But we also knew that the defect in the design of the condenser unit 2 training she opened at each stop of the turbine generator.

13) The fact that when the reservoir from which water flowed from the primary circuit through the valve quickly regained full, the operators have ignored for 3 hours the alarm was triggered.

14) The fact that an operator reads the wrong indicator when asked to give the temperature at the outlet of the valve of the primary circuit. Whereas if he had read the right indicator, the high temperature display would have shown that the valve was not closed.

15) The fact that operators have also ignored the fact that for 3 hours than normal temperatures have also been detected in the pipe connected to the wastegate.

16) The fact that operators have ignored the indication for 3 h a higher temperature and pressure in the containment building. This clearly indicated that there was a problem.

17) The fact that operators have not seen for at least 2 hours that the auxiliary building tanks receiving radioactive water from the containment building were filled.

18) The fact that the alarms did not sound the radioactivity when the tank was punctured and containment of radioactive water that spilled into the containment building. And also the fact that, oddly, they have worked 3 hours later (which means it worked). Or, (Since the fact that the alarms had not sounded that is defended in a document), the fact that the alarms are triggered, but the operators do not realize it are, and this for more than 3h .

19) The fact that Frederick had consulted indicator of water level in the containment tank too late, ie after the safety disc of it had been broken and the tank is emptied. So that the indicator had returned to normal levels.

20) The fact that operators are realizing that pumps the coolant began to vibrate strongly, they cut pumps in question, but they do not understand that it means they are pumping more steam than water and that it therefore means that there is enough water in the primary circuit.


B) Analysis of technical issues and those related to operators

All these problems, it is a lot. It is very huge. It's been too much for the theory of the accident is credible. Especially since they are not small problems or logical problems, no, these are huge problems and unbelievable.
What is the probability that 20 such incredible things happen on the same day in a place as controlled a plant? 1 in 100 million? No, the only possible reason for such an accumulation of events, it is a sabotage.


- The initial problem of demineralisers

What happened at that time was already very suspicious.

, plugging a water circuit to the second pneumatic system already indicates a clear intent to sabotage, especially just before a maintenance operation on demineralisers. The explanation that someone might have wanted to pressurize the water system or connect together the two systems by a pneumatic connection error seems completely farfetched. And then nobody would take responsibility of such a thing without consulting a manager. It is strictly impossible for a single operator is fun to do this without orders from a superior. And if a manager had given such an order, the operator having executed would not embarrassed to speak at the inquiry. So in reality, there is no convincing explanation for this act out of a desire to sabotage.

The fact that operators do not see that there was a pipe connecting the water circuit system Pneumatic control valves is very fishy. We are told that it was dark there. As if working in the dark, as if there was not enough light for them to see this problem of unauthorized connection. And even if that were the case, one can imagine that they would have then brought flashlights.

It also wonders why all this has not happened earlier, when the pipe was connected. The person (assuming it was done without intent to sabotage) that connected the two systems had to do it for immediate use of the craft. In this case, it would trigger the the disaster at that time. Maybe he was more open another valve to the water swept into the air instrument system. So we can not actually be sure it would have necessarily occur earlier. But there is still a big doubt on this point.

Moreover, regarding the survey conducted after the "accident", it says that the NRC has issued this hypothesis on the cause of the blockage of valves demineralisers. Only when performing an experiment to test the hypothesis, they were unable to obtain the expected result. So, the connection water system to the pneumatic system can not close the valves controlled by it. So the official explanation on the valves that are blocked due to water pressure which would be introduced into the pneumatic system fails.

So it is quite possible that the connection between the two circuits have been realized after the fact and in reality what has caused the closure of the valves would be a voluntary order of the operators or, alternatively, on a sabotage element of the pneumatic circuit, again, by operators.

Moreover, the history of the closure of valves demineralisers tends to be simplified in what we read in most descriptions. In fact, only the first demineraliser that was blocked. The valves of the other 8 demineralisers should have stayed open and the flow of water would therefore continue to pass. But they are closed almost at the same time as the first demineraliser. The official explanation is a mysterious connection error that would have resulted in other demineralisers should close when the first did. It would have yet another connection error. It's starting to do a lot. And then, again, we imagine such a thing can not be done without the consent of the person responsible. And one might think that the performer was then given the name of the officer responsible for the error. So one can imagine that in fact the connection error, it was actually quite voluntary.

It also says it has found that a compressed air pipe of one of demineralisers was broken. Investigators said the air could not flow into the demineraliser because of an automatic valve would close automatically. Only one operator has subsequently testified to having heard the air leaking into the demineraliser at the time of the accident. One hypothesis put forward by an operator is that it's a hammer that broke the pipeline in question. But the NRC investigators have subsequently found that the hammer was not as important as the operator had said. Therefore, since according to investigators, it could not be a natural cause that had caused the breaking of the air duct, one can again think of sabotage.

http://www.tmia.com/old-website/tmisab.html

Then a little later, there is the problem of relief valves in the circuit closed and not reopened following an intervention before 42h. While the procedure specifically states that they should be reopened. An "error" more human.

In addition, other error, the operators do not notice the light indicating that the valves remain closed, for one, because a service label conceals the lamp and the second simply because they notice it. You can of course ask questions about why the presence of the label maintenance. But it is mainly the fact that the light was not hidden was not noticed for 42 hours which is extremely suspicious (that they were not tilted on the presence maintenance of the label is suspicious too, but to a lesser extent). For 42h, the operators of the control room have a light that lights up when it never is, they know what match this light, yet they do not notice it. And at that moment, we can not rely on the fact that they were overwhelmed by alarms. So it's very very suspicious.

But it was there all these problems if we wanted that the accident happened. If the water system was not connected to the compressed air system controlling the valves of the first demineraliser, no reason why it hangs. If the compressed air system of the second demineraliser did not have a connection error, no reason any more than it freezes, and suddenly, no blocking of the secondary circuit. And if the relief valves of the circuit had been opened, the secondary circuit was supplied with water after a few seconds of blocking, and then no problem of temperature rise in the secondary circuit, and therefore not in the circuit primary. Similarly, it was the alarms yet clearly indicating that the valves were closed are ignored by the operators for over 42 hours. Otherwise, if they had reacted immediately, even problem: the secondary circuit and the primary circuit would have had no problem of temperature rise. So no opening of the discharge valve in the primary circuit and not melt the heart.

the way, having solved the problem of locked gates of the secondary circuit is nothing extraordinary. Insofar as it must certainly be an indicator of heat in the secondary circuit, they quickly saw that the secondary circuit does not cooled. So it would necessarily mean that the valves remained closed. I say this because it gives us the impression that there had been full of events that were happening, everything had to be super complicated and therefore, operators have to react very intelligent. No, it was completely basic.


- The problem of measurement of water level during the first 10 or 15 minutes

Part of the "accident" on the primary circuit will still show the best of sabotage.

Already, the explanations for disabling the automatic injection of water are flimsy. The history of water level indicator that does it more correctly when the discharge valve is opened makes absolutely no sense.

Already if the movements of water and steam were complex as can be read in the reports of the accident, they were also unstable. So the operator in charge of analyzing the pressure ought to have seen continual variations in water level.

the same kind of idea, it seems we are told that the pressure increased gradually. If the level meter of water was disrupted by the movement of water out of the situation leading to continual variations in pressure, possibly, there could have been one (very unlikely, but hey, suppose) where the indicator was pushed its maximum at all times. But then the pressure would not have risen steadily, but it would have been more than once. But apart from these two situations (change, or put the indicator at all), it is unclear how the complex movements of water, so erratic, could lead to a gradual increase in water level.

And then, once that water injection has been disabled, it is unclear what happened to the water level indicator. Is that the problem was solved? In principle, yes, since it seems people say that the water pressure dropped. And later, when water injection was reactivated, it does not seem to speak again of this problem. So why would he just had a malfunction at the beginning? Mystery. If it's because there was more water in the pressurizer (ie, at the very beginning of the problem, well before there was mostly steam in the primary circuit), then that would mean that happen mostly in situations somewhat removed from normal. So it should come almost every time he is opening the valve for 5 or 6 minutes. If the valve opens, because the heat and so the pressure become too important in the primary circuit. So there are chances that Then there is training movement of steam or water complex in the pressurizer. And if it was common long ago that it would be seen operators.

If it was not known and solved, it is simply that such movements do not exist. It is a pure ad hoc invention to explain that operators have not responded. If it were known, the designers of the plant would put other types of detectors to prevent the problem is not detected.

And also, the designers of the flag of the pressurizer water level it would clearly be seen during tests on the indicator.

We are told that when the safety injection was cut after a few minutes, an indication of water level has fallen. It indicated that the pressure decreased. So that means that the water level indicator worked properly again. The gradual decrease in pressure makes it clear that there was a loss of fluid. So at that point, the traders would immediately understand that the valve was left open.

Moreover, it would be a good indicator of pressure. There he was an analyzer water level apparently. So if there was also pressure analyzer (not because of malfunction, him), there would have been a second indicator that contradicts the first.


- The valve can be closed only 40 times

Then, the story of valve that can be closed successfully, 40 times before they know a failure of closure is also highly suspect.

Imagine badly for something as critical in an environment where security issues are crucial, we could have a material that is so unreliable. It is said that this valve was supposed to work only very rarely. But even very rarely seen the absolutely crucial role of this valve, there should have been out of the question if it has a low reliability. Moreover, it is unclear what would be a problem for the closure of a single valve.

It is said that the problem was that it was never designed to be a problem at the opening, but in return, she frequently posed problems for the closure. But in this case, the double valve with another valve downstream, which she did not have these problems closing.

And if the second valve is suspected of having problems at the opening, then made a second discharge circuit. That way, no danger that the pressure can not be evacuated, and no danger either that the liquid can escape from the primary circuit due to a failure of the valve closing.

In any case, if the valve is left with no duplicates, then it is sure to have indicators that provide precisely the situation of the valve, with redundant sensors of course.

The fact that the valve indicator reports only that the stop order was given, but there is no indicator showing the exact position of the valve (open or closed) is So incredible. Why make an alarm that only serves to say that the order has been given, then we know that the valve is lousy and can not serve as forty times? Hello something fishy.

Especially it seems clear that the problem does not come from too rapid wear of the mechanism of the valve, but it's a random problem. So, a change valve, or maintenance thereof had no effect on the number of cycles before the first failure of closure. The issue should arrive early or late in a power plant. The presence of indicators to report its actual condition was all the more necessary.

The most plausible version is that the valve had a running time with success far beyond what we're told. This story would be an explanation ad hoc to make us accept the fact that the valve broke down just at that time. It is on with all other failures and "errors" of operators, if the problem of the valve was considered exceptional, the idea of sabotage could have come to the minds of people. It could be the straw that broke the camel's back. In fact, the valve was functioning perfectly, but it had to be sabotaged (or is the software controlling its closure has been tampered with).


- Operators does not include more than 3 hours during the valve remained open

The fact that for two hours, operators do not realize that the valve remained open is totally unbelievable. This is clearly the most incredible of all, that clearly indicates the willingness of sabotage.

There are too many elements that showed that the valve remained open so that operators were unable to understand that she was.

• The temperature rises and the pressure drop indicated clearly where the problem came

Already, the fact the most obvious is that the temperature continued to rise more in the primary circuit of water while the pressure decreased. If the pressure decreased and the temperature increased, it is inevitably that either the system (and therefore the valve) was not closed and there was loss of liquid or the temperature gauge was out of adjustment.

The first hypothesis was to remember that there was no error indicator. In this case, the fact that the pressure decreases as the temperature increase shows unambiguously that the system was not closed. In a closed system, variations of these two measures are the same meaning. If it goes in the opposite direction is that the system is not closed. And if it was not closed, it was obviously that the valve had not closed. And given the low reliability of the valve, we do not see what operators could find surprising. There could be a leak elsewhere of course, a breach in the primary circuit. But the thing to check first, it was clearly the relief valve.

If the valve was closed and the temperature gauge was deregulated, it means that there was no danger in delay and in fact everything was normal. Since the secondary circuit was again in water, it was clear that the primary circuit was cooled without problem. So it was on the potential problem of the lack of closure of the valve need to concentrate efforts analysis.

In fact, he could not even be simply error on the temperature gauge, since the pressure fell too, and quickly found very low. If there had been an error on the temperature (so it actually fell), and the valve was actually closed, then the pressure would decrease the course, but only slightly. She would not have fallen so sharply. So, if the valve was closed, it means that the two indicators were false, temperature, and pressure. Given that the probability that both indicators are failing was very low, it meant so clearly that it was good the second solution: the valve was open, and therefore the coolant was leaking, which lowered the increasing pressure and temperature.

So everything had to run the analysis primarily to the state of the discharge valve, and only then, possibly, the temperature gauge.

Once this is established, it is clear that in addition to check all indicators that can reveal that the valve remained open, he immediately had to test the reaction of the primary circuit by closing the valve located behind the discharge valve. If the temperature had risen more slowly, or had stabilized, had begun to show off, and if the pressure had begun to rise, he was immediately clear that the valve was indeed the problem. The fact that the operators have not performed this operation is also highly suspicious.

So having ignored the 4 or 5 indicators exponent obvious that the relief valve was open already shows a clear sabotage. These indicators were sufficient in themselves so that there is no doubt about the origin of the problem (the valve). But increasingly, as it was already perfectly clear logical point of view that there was loss of fluid in the primary circuit, having ignored these indicators shows unambiguously that there was sabotage on the part of operators. When we know that there are only two possible reasons for a phenomenon, and that systematically ignores the indicators pointing clearly one of these two reasons, and besides, it is almost impossible that this is the other reason (seen here, the secondary circuit was in water) is that there will sabotage . Especially when this blindness lasts two hours.

• indicators ignored for 3 hours

elements to realize that the relief valve was left open are: 1) The fact that when the reservoir from which water flowed through the primary circuit the valve was quickly regained full, the operators have ignored for three hours the alarm was triggered. 2) The fact that an operator read the wrong indicator when asked to give the temperature at the outlet of the valve of the primary circuit. 3) The fact that operators have also ignored the fact that for 3 h temperature above normal was also detected in the pipe connected to the valve discharge. 4) The fact that operators have ignored for 3 h indicating a higher temperature and pressure in the containment building. This clearly indicated that there was a problem. 5) The fact that Frederick had consulted indicator of water level in the containment tank too late, ie after the disc Security of it had been broken and the tank is empty. So that the indicator had returned to normal levels.

On problems 1, 3 and 4, well that's what. For 3 hours, the operators had these indicators under the eyes. As we have seen, they necessarily knew that the most likely cause of the problem encountered was that the valve was left open. These indicators on their side necessarily implied that the relief valve was open. And for 3 hours, they did nothing. Such a thing is absolutely impossible without intent to sabotage. We can not ignore systematically for 3 hours of indicators we have under our eyes without it being voluntary. Especially when it is many. Already, with a single person, it's completely unbelievable, then, with several people, it's impossible.

Moreover, one can think that there should be indicators not identified in the various articles on "accident" that should reveal the problem of the valve. For example, there should be other tools to know the pressure in the primary circuit. In an area as sensitive, there is obviously redundant measuring instruments, so that if one fails, two or three others can be consulted to see what happens. We are told once completed, the containment tank is then poured into the containment. Again, there should be a detector which would indicate the thing. And there must have detectors of radioactivity in the containment. Therefore, the presence of radioactive water would be immediately detected also from that angle.

The fact that the technician to give the temperature at the outlet of the valve of the primary circuit is wrong Zewe indicator (bp 2) and read the temperature output of another valve is a little drop of water the last straw. After a number of "errors" Human (system connection compressed air and water, poor connection on the second demineraliser not check the valve opening, maintenance label on one indicator, but ignored other visible indicator, indicators systematically ignored for 3 hours, etc ...) can no longer speak of clumsiness or error, we can only speak of betrayal. But it is on that if you had said that Zewe had not thought of that, it would have seemed too suspicious. So they said he had thought, but there was an error reading.

Regarding the fact that the supervisor has watched indicator of filling the tank containment too late (bp 5), we must see the timing of the thing. At the 8th minute, the problem was solved for the secondary circuit. Therefore, operators could concentrate on the primary circuit. They had already seen that there was a problem with it. So, finally having time, they would have to focus on this problem (which is still the largest component of the plant). So, given that between the 8th minute and 15th, there was an indicator showing that the containment reservoir was filled, they would have to notice it (think there was an alarm signal). They had 7 minutes to notice it. Then, when the tank was full, there is an alarm that sounds for 3h. For 3 h, the operators could not but realize that. When the disc from the containment tank broke and water flowed out of the reservoir, a measuring instrument for 3 h indicated that the heat and pressure were above normal. The operators could not move next to it.

• More Details

Furthermore, one might think they should know exactly the amount of fluid lost by the primary circuit. It must necessarily be an indicator of filling the tank. So just a simple subtraction to find out how much water was lost by the primary circuit and how many had been injected by the injection safety. We know then how much water remains in the primary circuit (and depending on the temperature, what must be the pressure). So why, initially, to stop the transfer of water because of the pressure then you should know that in fact the primary circuit has already lost a lot of water and can not be pressure situation?

Another problem is that the vibration of pumps also indicated that the primary circuit had more water and therefore that the valve remained open. If Zewe saw that the pumps were shaking, it would necessarily do what the reasoning. But no, Zewe does not understand.

is strange that there was not an alarm set for the disc to break security (apparently so, since we do not talk about in any reports) . Because of this rupture disk must still be a major problem for a plant. And once the visual alarm begins to tilt, it should not stop. So we shall see sooner or later.

Another thing, in "the nuclear accident at TMI day 1 (part 4), it is said that in fact, radioactive water flowing from the primary building to building auxiliary pumps through drains was stored in a tank in the auxiliary building. So, the water was not reflected directly in the auxiliary building. And suddenly, it means that here too, there should be indicators of filling, pressure gauges, etc. ... So, the filling of reservoirs in the auxiliary building would be seen by the operators.

As already mentioned, regarding the timing or the first alarm to radioactivity began to ring, the sources are contradictory. According to versions, it was dispatched to the 15th minute of the accident ("Engineering.com") or so it has not rung to moment by failure of the alarm ("TMI step by step") or the operators have realized that water was radioactive in the 45th minute (Everything). Moreover, it is said that only T = 2:45, the alarm goes off to radioactivity (English version of wikipedia). Finally, according to the French version of Wikipedia, is that at T = 3:12 the alarm goes off to radioactivity. Engineering.com contradicts himself apparently himself, it is said that the alarm sounds when the radioactivity at the time Porter arrived in the control room (so to 6am, either at T = 2h). 5 sources that contradict all, more a contradiction in a source, that's a lot.

In any case, it was an incredible malfunction or human error by more incredible. If the alarm went off at T = 15 minutes, as it would make sense, it means that very early during the "accident", the operators had a very important addition to understanding what was going on and the valve that again they have not understood for about 1h45. Even with an alarm is triggered in the 45th minute, it is still 1:15 to flat encephalogram. And if the alarms had been triggered around 2:45 or 3:12, it means that there was dysfunction of the alarm before it (and even more alarms as quickly, the water was pumped into the drains that had apparently sensors radioactivity), which is equally amazing (and especially then, the alarm would work).

We are told that T = 2 hours (6am), the engineer in the morning, Ivan Porter, sees that the primary circuit pressure is low. So the pressure indicator showed the correct pressure well for a while if the engineer could see that the pressure was low. Therefore, operators of the control room should have been noticing long. He also notes that the temperature in the containment tank is very high. So, there was also a temperature sensor in the tank containment, in addition to a water level sensor. Therefore, also, the operators should have realized that the primary circuit water was being discharged into the containment tank.

Towards the end of the crisis between T = T = 3:12 2:22 ET, we do not understand why the operators have closed the valve downstream of the valve of the pressurizer (to stop the evacuation of water then), and have given a pump, all without getting water again. If they have closed the valve, that they had to realize that the valve was still open. And from there, they were bound to realize that she had remained open for over 2 hours. So they knew that the primary circuit was heavily drained. They would therefore introduce the cooling water and more. Obviously, we understand much better if it were traitors.

One wonders also how they calculated the amount of water back into the primary circuit. Because if the pressure indicator is crappy and joking when there are cavitation, Well it is completely unreliable. However, since we apparently relies solely on him to determine the amount of water in the heart, it is unclear how one could know how much there is still water in the heart, and therefore, how much water must be reset so that it is again fully submerged. But by chance, at this point, the indicator does more messing.


- Operators supposedly overwhelmed by alarms

To explain the fact that operators did not understand what was going on for over 3 hours, we are told that the operators were overwhelmed by the indicators. C'mon.

They say that the alarms were lit everywhere. But anyway, what matters are the indicators, not alarms. And until further notice, the indicators, they were not gone mad (besides the problem of the indicator valve, which was only 1 indicator wrong. And yet, the problem was inherent in the design of the instrument). So, it was enough that they analyze the indicators. And once solved the problem of the secondary circuit, there was not 36 things changed in the plant. There were only the primary circuit temperature increased and the pressure dropped. None of this should be surprising for an operator. In when radioactive water spilled in the containment tank and the containment building and finally, in the auxiliary building of the reservoir, well exactly, that would make clear the origin of the problem (the fact that the valve remained open).

Anyway, they are supposed to be trained for this kind of situation. We must train them not to let panic alarms and by not watching the indicators. And as we have seen, there were many indicators that allow to understand the situation. Especially because, come earlier, the events have not gone in 10 minutes, which would actually justify the operators have been flooded with alarms, but in 3:20, leaving plenty of time to understand the situation, especially with all the engineers present.

And like all control rods were lowered, and the secondary circuit was again in water, operators in the control room had almost no problem. They could take their time, since the heart is still retained (before cooling completely), a few megawatts of heat. And the fact that everything has happened so slowly shows. So even if there were actually indicators that were flashing everywhere, operators no longer reason to stress completely. They could analyze the relatively quietly.

And we are told that the operators were flooded with alarms, but obviously, as it happens, we are not told why. If that were the case, they would have said what alarms flashed and how it made them cautious in what it was they did not understand what was happening. They would have said what the alarms that have attracted their attention at a given moment, and why it attracted their attention. Moreover, in such circumstances, we develop hypotheses. But almost nowhere we are told assumptions developed by operators at any given time (except to the very end), what they did to verify the hypothesis in question was good, and when they realized it was bad. This is normal, in fact, they absolutely do not reflected in the assumptions, they knew very well what was happening. They waited quietly closing the valve of the primary circuit at the right time (or valve located downstream from it).

In fact, it is not sure what alarms did not see the problem that remained he could still occur. Everything was fixed in the secondary circuit. So it should no longer be any alarms that side. Most of the alarms should be focused on what the problem, namely the primary circuit. So the alarm in question were certainly useful alerts and focused on the problem of the moment. In any case, we can consider this a spate of false alarms distracting the operators of the main problem.

Most likely, it is certainly that all the alarms were not set to operate at the same time, those who sounded the alarms were significant, but they decided to ignore them because they were traitors simply.

On the evidence of the flooding of the alarms (and evidence of how the accident happened), it seems that everything is based on reports provided by the printer used to transcribe the alarms of the control room . However, according to traders, there were so many alarms that are triggered during the first moments of the warning that the printer could not keep up. More time passed, the more she fell behind. After 2 hours, operators control room had emptied the memory of the printer to print out alarms yet. Suddenly, the alarm information by chance have been lost forever. Thereby allowing operators to invent this story avalanche of alarms (and absent from triggering the alarm for certain events)-post as they wanted. Nobody could contradict them.

In any case, it means that for this story avalanche of alarms, there is no evidence. Only the good times that operators must rest.

That said, it's hard to believe that they rested on the printer to have a history of events and they could not go back in time with the computer (on the screen connected to one) to see what had happened. They have been able to verify the pressure development during the last hour and see what happened to that level.

Congratulating On Pregnancy Message

Accident at Three Mile Island, again, most likely sabotage government

For Three Mile Island, there is no problem of moderating graphite rods that go down too slowly. And no problem of incompetent officials chosen by the central power, or so-called technicians malformed. So, what they could invent this time to justify the melting of the heart?

Since the problem can not come bars moderation (as in the case of Chernobyl, it is said to want such a problem could not happen with the Western central) can already be almost sure that he comes from cooling water. And this may also indicate a priori that there has been a long series of incidents that it has come to a partial melting of the heart. And actually, when you analyze what happened, it does.


1) The conduct official "accident"

The official version is roughly as follows. Indeed, the cooling circuit has a problem. There was an incredible series of failures that led to that there is enough water in the heart, that without the operators do not notice the problem, which led to a partial melting of the latter. Fortunately, operators have come to understand what was happening, and it manages to avoid a complete melting of the heart.

Here's how things went this March 28, 1979. Everything happened in about 3h20.


A) The first moments of the accident

(Note: there is a small summary at end of subchapter, if you want to zap this passage)

Shortly before 4 am, a problem appeared with one of the 8 demineralisers water secondary circuit. These water tanks in which water flowing in the secondary circuit is demineralized. It seems that this is done using beads made of a resin to which minerals cling. Regularly so, remove the resin beads used, and replace them with new ones. This operation is done very regularly. And until then it had been a problem twice, but never reach such a disaster.

Only this time, after isolating that tank of water flow generally, the flow of air under pressure, however, used several times (and a stream of water or steam) has failed to release the accumulated resin beads. They had indeed collapsed into a compact mass. William Zewe, the supervisor, then called Fred Sheimann, a foreman, to help two operators assigned to this task to solve the problem.

Such a thing was definitely not unusual. It happened regularly. It even happened so often that it was installed on each of the 8 scrubber tanks of pressurized air hoses connected to the ventilation system generally. Short bursts of air under pressure generally sufficient to dislodge the agglomerate of resin beads.

In addition to the main ventilation system, there is a second system of ducts of pressurized air, called air instrument system, which was used to control pneumatic valves in some of the plant. This system was essential for the safety of the plant.

The official, that the operators did not know is that someone during the night, had a plastic tube connected between this system of instruments for air and water pipeline. According to some assumptions, he might have tried to pressurize the water line, or connect the two systems air units. This connection of the two systems was made possible by the fact that the instrument system, air ventilation system and main water pipes of the plant using all of the same pneumatic Chicago. The area was quite dark, and the equipment was not properly labeled. However, the water line had more pressure than the air instrument system. So, according to the official theory, water began pouring into the air ducts. However, this instrument system air pneumatically controlled valves connecting demineralisers the secondary circuit. The closing of the valves had to cause the blockage of water flow in the secondary circuit, and soon after, the automatic shutdown of pumps in the secondary circuit.

Also at 3:57, while Scheimann was on top of a pipe feeding the resin beads peeping through a window, the water finally reaches the pneumatic valve demineralisers. Carried by the air pressure, he had traveled along the instrument system to air, eventually entering the control valves.

However, shortly after the plant has entered into business, 5 years earlier, in 1974, someone was concerned the possible risk of a passage of water in the air instrument system. It was understood that it would lead to close the valves. So a plan was discussed to change the system of control valves. If such a thing happens, the valves are stuck in their current position. Nobody knows why, but the wiring for such amendment had never been connected.


B) the first in the 8th minute of the accident: the problem of spray and the secondary circuit

Note: you must keep in mind that the events described in this subpart have place in only 8 minutes. This part is perhaps the most complicated, but at the same time the least important, since in fact, most problems were solved quickly (in 8 minutes so).

When the water came from valves, or in any case, the pressure was large enough, instantly, they have closed violently. The valves of the other 7 demineralisers that remained open were closed in an instant. A water hammer occurs, driven by the sudden stop of water flow. Faust and Frederick felt the ground shake control room while the violent shock snatched control valves, crack the shell of a water pump broke and the pipes. Scheimann jumped on the side just as the pipe on which he was heaved violently. Within seconds, the whole building was filled with auxiliary steam.

In the control room, the automatic control of the plant were operating as intended. With the system of water circulation off and the control system off valves, water could not reach the steam generators. So, they might dry in seconds and get in a boil. Such a thing should certainly not happen. Because too much heat causes the rupture of the tubes. Suddenly, the water of primary circuit water flowed into the secondary water circuit.

To prevent this, automatic systems were activated. 5 seconds after the pumps stop, the turbine power generator was stopped. In general, it causes the opening of bypass valves, which discharge directly while the steam from the steam generator to the condenser, bypassing the turbine.

But the condenser at Three Mile Island was a slight flaw in its design. The steam from the bypass valve was oriented in such a way that if a jet of steam suddenly happened, it would blow the water from the condenser in the vacuum pump of the condenser. That's exactly what happened. And the vacuum pump suffocating under water stopped. When the condenser has lost vacuum due to vacuum, he could not accept steam longer. Suddenly, the pass system has stopped.

With the condenser off-duty, tons of steam were still evacuated. Also, a set of external nozzles, called atmospheric unloaders, were opened up, sending the steam flow to the outside of the plant, with a roar deafening was heard for miles. Residents around Middletown and Royalton were awakened by the first external sign of problems on the island.

The loss of water supply meant that the reactor's heat had nowhere to go. Also, temperature and pressure began to rise. Detecting this, the control system has shut down the reactor (again 5 seconds after stopping the pumps), and within seconds, all control rods were lowered.

However, the reactor core does not cool instantaneously once the bars control lowered. Residual heat can still be a few megawatts. The steam generator thus continuing to threaten to boil dry because of lack of water. Also, 3 water pumps relief, 2 electric and operated via the steam flow was automatically set in motion to provide the necessary water flow to the steam generators that were being emptied.

But there was another problem. Valves that allow the connection of those pumps back to the secondary circuit were closed. A test was conducted on the emergency circuit 42 hours before, causing the closure of two valves (called EFW-12 A and B). And while the procedure requires an imperative that they be immediately reopened, the operators had forgotten to do so. And no operator knew they were closed. Operators should have appreciated, as there is a light that shows whether the valve is open or closed. But one of the two lights were hidden by a label maintenance and operators simply do not pay attention to the second. Indeed, they did not expect that the valves are closed since they were always open usual. Moreover, one of the first things checked in the checklist operators control room, is that the backup circuit works well. But Faust did not see the indicator light remained visible, and alleged that the valves were open, as they should be and had always been before.

So in fact, the emergency pumps walked. But the standby circuit was not open. So, the water still did not circulate in the secondary circuit.

Because the blocking of the secondary circuit, immediately, heat and pressure increased in the primary circuit. Also, very quickly, at T = 3 seconds, the discharge valve Automatic, on top of the pressurizer opened, releasing steam from the primary circuit in a containment tank. She should close automatically when the pressure had dropped. But despite an order of automatic closure, it was not the case. She is stuck in open position.

Since the reactor was stopped, the heat in the primary system began to decline. The water started to cool and thus also the pressure (the pressure decreases also due to the discharge valve open). Also, the water level in the pressurizer began to decline. It was a phenomenon expected. Faust and Frederick attended the automatic start at T = 2 min, two pumps for supplying water to offset the volume decrease (pumps off). Then, when the level continued to decline, special pumps for the injection system at high pressure have been working to bring more water into the reactor vessel. At that time, the relief valve should have closed but, as we have seen, this was not the case.

In general relief, the water level began to stabilize. Then, general anxiety, he began to climb again. Fearing that the cushioning effect of the pressurizer is soon lost as he was finishing his fill, Faust stopped the injection system with high pressure coolant system. But the level continued to rise. So he stopped the pumps off. It still continued to rise. Frederick looked sweating big drops. He recalled the numbers of water level, while the water was rising in the pressurizer until it almost overflowed through the relief valve.

Faust, Frederick Zewe and tried to understand the nature of the problem. Nothing stuck.

Regarding the secondary circuit, the water level continued to decline in the steam generators. In fact, one of them was completely dry and hot. It is a very dangerous situation, because the generators are not designed to reach such temperatures. If a pipe from the steam generator were to crack or break due to heat, radioactive water from the primary circuit could be mixed with water from the secondary circuit and leave the containment building, which would be catastrophic. There was considerable confusion regarding the original reason for the steam generator (OTSG) was drying up and boil. Indeed, from what I understand the operators, the emergency pumps water supply were in the process to provide all water necessary for the steam generators. But in reality, with the valves closed, the pumps were useless.

The amount of water available in the primary circuit is usually measured by measuring the water level in the pressurizer. More water means that the vapor bubble decreases and the water level rises, and vice versa. However, while the primary system was losing water very quickly, operators have seen an increase in water level. The official explanation given a posteriori is that the flow of steam from the discharge valve to the disrupted water level indicator. One can imagine that the flow of steam upwardly traced the indicator. Therefore, operators have been mistaken in their estimate of the pressure due to water level indicator.

The temperature continued to rise in the primary circuit, despite the fact that the reactor had been shut down. This was the result of the lack of provision of emergency water to steam generators, for removing heat from the primary circuit.

also lowered the pressure in the primary circuit. Insofar as the temperature and the pressure going in the same direction in a closed system, all three were completely lost face this paradox. Of course, had they known that the discharge valve was opened, they would have known they did not do in a closed system.

One thing was certain, if pressure fell too low, or if the temperature rose too, the primary circuit water start to boil. If such things happen, and if the temperature rose enough in the heart of the steam begin to form in the reactor vessel. If enough steam was produced, it would lower the water level inside the reactor below the level of uranium rods, leaving them exposed. The steam does not cool as well as water, and uranium rods would be severely damaged by the accumulation of heat. They would break quickly. After a while, the uncovering of the core implies that the uranium could begin to melt, see ignite, or even possibly rearrange in a more compact, which would entail the production of even more heat. It would obviously be disastrous. So, the heart must never be overdrawn.

Too much water in the primary circuit would also be a problem. If the pressurizer, the steam bubble allowed in the primary circuit was completely filled, any sudden shock or transient could cause the pipes break or damage the primary circuit water pumps. This is something to avoid at all costs, because a broken pipe in the primary circuit is the worst nightmare of Engineers reactor. The operators are regularly repeat never, ever "complete system". So, being on the brink of this type of event carries with it a palpable fear in the control room.

Deceived by an indication of incorrect water level, operators decided to open the floodgates ejection and start pumps to drain water from the primary circuit. Now the water coming out of the primary circuit by either one, but two ways out: the relief valve and the ejection system. Reacting to the loss of pressure injection pumps activated at a low pressure situation, have automatically begun to pour water into the primary circuit. Operators, unaware of the real situation, have adopted (at T = 4 min 38s). While water coming out of the reactor through the discharge valve, they were simply neutralized the only system able to replace the discharged water, and they evacuated more.

Suddenly, water began to boil out of the heart (at T = 5 min 30s)

At that time, Faust has come quickly once again the power of the checklist emergency water from the secondary circuit. This time checking each valve in the system, he finally removed the label and saw the red lights indicating that the water supply valves 12A and 12B were closed, blocking the flow.

He then yelled at Zewe: "The 12 are closed!". AT = 8min 18s, Faust and then put in the open position. The cold water rushed boiling in the pipes of the steam generator. The heat of the primary circuit has finally been cooled by the secondary circuit. The indicator of water level in the pressurizer was then slowly stabilized, and the temperature rise began to slow, but just slow.

Abstract: Many human errors led assumed that all valves are closed demineralisers, so that the movement of water in the secondary circuit is blocked. The automatic safety system operated normally. They have arrested the nuclear reaction in the heart. But there were two failures. The first, which was resolved in 8 minutes, is that the supply valves relief secondary circuit water had been shut down following a recent technical inspection. As a result, the secondary circuit was emptied of its water. This, together with the primary circuit were no longer cooled and the heat was increasing rapidly in both circuits. Fortunately, in the 8th minute, operators have understood the problem and have opened the floodgates in question. The secondary circuit has found when supplied with water, and thus was re-cooled properly. The second failure is that the valve venting steam from the primary circuit in case of pressure had been opened by the automatic safety, but had not closed. Moreover, operators have cut the automatic water injection in the primary circuit (the first high pressure, then the low pressure). The water is consequently of primary circuit without being replaced. And it could not be cooled. It is this problem which has not been resolved for over two hours, which resulted in melting the heart.


C) In the 8th minute to 3:20, an almost total inaction despite the possession of the items to solve the problem

So there we were in the 8th minute of the accident. The incident lasted 3:20, it means that everything that is told now lasts 3:12, so much longer than the first part. Operators have had much more time to react. And yet for 1:52 (to T = 2h), they did nothing, and for another 1:20, despite some actions, they still have not understood what was happening.

a) From the 8th to the 15th minute: no detection of the opening of the valve of the primary circuit

Getting back to the beginning of the accident, as we have seen, when the pumps Main the secondary cooling circuit broke down, 3 seconds later to prevent the pressure increases too much in the primary circuit, the pressurizer relief valve of the primary circuit opened automatically. The steam began to flow into the tight containment building.

Especially this valve has been a problem throughout the duration of the accident. She should have closed down again once the pressure in the primary circuit. But despite the automatic order closure, it was not the case.

The explanation given is that the valve was designed to close after have removed a certain amount of pressure. But it was not reliable. In fact, the electromagnetic valve for discharge, made by Dresser Industries was known to have problems of failure to close. It was estimated that the average number of maneuvers to open / close before there was a failure of only 40 laborers. We thought it was sufficient, because the valve was supposed to open only rarely (the same valve on Unit 1 at Three Mile Island had never been open, except during tests). But the flaw in the design of the condenser unit 2 training she opened at each stop of the turbine generator.

operators have been very close on this circuit discharge steam manually. But the problem is that the lights showed the control valve closed. Indeed, the light was poorly designed, and unresponsive to the closure order, not the actual closing. It was enough to give the closure order for the light indicates a closed position, even if it was true. Therefore, operators, believing the problem resolved, have not responded, and the valve still open, the pressure continued to decline in the primary circuit.

operators should have known there was a problem with the valve, because there is a good indicator of water pressure in the primary circuit (called the pressurizer). So as the pressure decreases as the valve was still open, the problem with the valve should have been quickly detected. But again, no luck, we are told (on Wikipedia):

"The drop in pressure in the primary circuit led the automatic startup of the circuit safety injection (t = 2min 01s), to bring water in the primary circuit. But at the same time as the pressure decreased, the "empty (Of water vapor actually) were formed in the primary circuit. These voids générèrent complex movements of water which, paradoxically, filled the pressurizer water (although the top of the circuit). The operator, having information that the pressurizer was full, erroneously concludes that while the primary circuit and was also stopped manually circuit safety injection (t = 4min 38s). "

So the primary circuit was emptied, but we could not know that because of complex movements of water continued to fill the pressurizer. Really decidedly unlucky.

And operators were unaware of the problem of the relief valve for 2 hours, until the arrival of the morning shift. And they were unaware of the problem of draining the primary circuit during 3h20.

Suddenly, the water injection system of an automatic safety was off, and the amount of water decreases more in the primary circuit, water has begun to boil over at the outlet of the heart (t = 5min 30s). A note that the safety injection system was turned off, not only stopped occasionally.

b) In the 15th minute to second time of the accident

The tank in which water flowed from the primary circuit through the valve quickly regained full. An alarm was triggered. A temperature above normal was also detected in the pipe connected to the wastegate, and a higher temperature and pressure in the containment building. This indicated clearly that there was a problem. But, initially, these instructions have been ignored by the operators (note: in fact, they were ignored for 3 hours).

So, since the reservoir was full and that he continued to fill, the safety disc ruptured tank (at T = 15 minutes). Quickly, the containment building was flooded with radioactive water, part of it flowed into the drains of the ground and was sucked into the auxiliary building tanks. Frederick thought to check the tank level (on an instrument panel located behind the main, not visible from where he sat), but only after breaking the record of safety. And at that moment, as the tank is emptied, the water had returned to normal levels. Decidedly dogged by bad luck. The pressure in the containment building began to rise.

Following this, for another 1 hour, while full of indicators already allow to fully understand the situation, the operators do not understand what is happening.

Regarding the time the first alarm to radioactivity began to ring, the sources are contradictory. Normally, it's a start when the tank was punctured containment, therefore, towards the 15th minute of the accident. This seems to say the site "Engineering.com", which says that soon after the safety disc had been broken, the alarm to the radioactivity began to ring.

But in "TMI step by step", it says that the alarm radioactivity simply does not ring. Other sources (Everything) say that the operators have realized that the water was radioactive in the 45th minute. And they put it on the fact that the water was pumped from the containment building into the auxiliary building. Specifically, they say that when the tank was punctured at its base in the 15th minute, spilling 250,000 gallons (about 950 tons) of water in the containment, pump has started to evacuate automatically the water to the auxiliary building (in fact to other reservoirs in the auxiliary building). 29 minutes later, the operators realized that the cooling water was being transferred to the auxiliary building, was radioactive. They immediately cut off the pump.

On the English version of Wikipedia, it says that only T = 2:45, the alarm goes off to radioactivity.

Finally, the French version of Wikipedia, is at T = 3:12 the radioactivity warning is triggered, because the injected water to time in the containment building there would have been highly radioactive.

Engineering.com contradicts himself apparently himself, it is said that just when Porter arrived in the control room (so around 6 am, or at T = 2h), the radioactive water located in the containment building happens in the annex building through drains water and the radioactivity alarms begin to ring and then move into position maximum. So the alarm would have sounded much later.

For the problem of when the alarm went off radioactivity, things are really not clear.

To return to what was happening also in the 20th minute, the temperature and pressure began to increase sharply in the containment building, due to the heat of the steam. Operators would have overview and then activating the cooling system of the containment building. It is said that they did not understand that these conditions resulted from the fact that the primary circuit lost its coolant indicates a significant deficiency in their training to analyze the symptoms of such an accident.

After a time not specified but must be close to 45 minutes (thus T = 1 hour), the primary circuit pumps begin to tremble because they are pumping more steam than water. Indeed, early, pressure and temperature were such that the water began to boil. Des bulles de vapeur ont commencé à se former, à voyager à travers le circuit et à atteindre les pompes. These huge machines, as wide as a cement truck, and 20 times more powerful, began to vibrate and to be dangerously strained, as they struggled to pump the mixture of steam and water. Flow velocity began to decrease, raising the temperature even further. Vibration as they could blow the seals of the rotors of the pump, and spewing water from the primary circuit, and making the pump unusable. Knowing he had no choice, Zewe ordered that the pumps are stopped before they destroy themselves and the pipes to which they were connected.

The problem is that the vibration of pumps also indicated that the primary circuit had more water and therefore the valve was left open. So if Zewe saw that the pumps were shaking, it would necessarily do what the reasoning. But no, Zewe does not understand.

So, at T = 1:13, operators decide to stop the pump 1 of the primary circuit. They are still nearly 30 minutes without doing anything, then at T = 1:40, they cut the pump 2 of the primary circuit. It does them no problem, because normally, with the engine stopped, the convection of heat in the primary circuit water should be sufficient to cool the heart. In short, the reactor stopped, normally, there is no need for pumps.

Now, the only movement of water remaining in the circuit is the movement of natural convection. That operators do not realize is that because of steam formation, portions of the primary system are now blocked by steam. Suddenly, the water can not flow by convection alone. A large vapor bubble, began to develop in the upper part of the reactor vessel, and rapidly increased in size. Soon, the upper heart began to emerge from the water and began to overheat.

At one point falling in this period of time, Zewe, in a sudden flash of lucidity, began to suspect that the relief valve might well have remained stuck open. He asked a technician to read the temperature at the outlet of the valve. High temperature would indicated that the steam was going through the valve, but the technician had mistakenly read the temperature of another outlet valve, which was low and normal. As a result, the valve remained open.

c) The arrival of the morning shift at T = 2h

At 6 o'clock in the morning is to say, to T = 2h, the morning shift arrives. The engineer in the morning a man named Ivan Porter, remarks at T = 2:20 minutes the temperature in the containment tank is very high (thus, there was also a temperature sensor in the tank containment, in addition to detector water level). He also sees that the primary circuit pressure is low (thus, the pressure indicator showed very good pressure for a while if the engineer could see that the pressure was low), and the pressure of the containment building is high . He made the connection between these different information. He then suggested closing a valve blockage in the flow stream, immediately behind the discharge valve was blocked. Once this is done, the pressure starts to rise again in the primary circuit.

is at T = 2:22, 40 minutes after the last action, then there is no more than a meter of water in the heart, the engineer in the morning decided to close a valve downstream of the valve of the pressurizer. It stops the draining of the primary circuit.

In fact, Porter and others do not seem to understand the situation, because then they would inject water into the primary circuit, they do nothing like that. Which would however be logical, since if Porter has decided to close the valve in question, he understood that the primary circuit was emptied. And given the heat and various other problems, it should be obvious to them that the primary circuit is almost empty. So, this is only an hour after they decide to activate the emergency water injection.

The English version of Wikipedia, at T = 2:45, that is to say at 6:45, the alarm goes off to radioactivity. Information found on "TMI step by step". But they stipulate that operators receive the first indications that the radiation level is increasing.

We do not know why, but operators decide to resume at T = 2:54 (30 minutes after closing the valve), a primary circuit pump. Suddenly, he saw no more than a meter of water in the heart, and that it was damaged due to lack of water, it rocks heavily contaminated water (And given what has already been mentioned, it does not stir much. It should run virtually empty).

AT = 3h, due to the high temperatures observed in the heart, operators are beginning to wonder if it is emerged or if it is still submerged, and therefore begins to say that the measured temperatures may be false. In addition, Gary Miller, the director, who had already had a conference call at 6 am with the leaders present in the plant comes into it.

20 minutes after (T = 3:12), operators decide (again, we do not know why) to stop the pump. Immediately after, they decided to reopen for 5 min isolation valve that closed the valve of the pressurizer. The water then flows from the reactor back into the containment building. The French version of Wikipedia, this is the moment that the radioactivity warning is triggered, because the injected water at this point in the containment building there would have been highly radioactive.

Operators then leave the building in haste and close tightly. The alarms go off around the plant. The site is declared Emergency and evacuation of areas near the plant begins.

Only this time, hearing the alert to radioactivity, as operators begin to understand the situation. They say the radioactivity warning means that the heart was severely damaged and he must run out of water. At 7:20 am, either at T = 3:20, they put into operation the safety injection. That is to say, they take water in the primary circuit and thus drown the heart again under water. According to the English Wikipedia is in fact at 11 am (ie at T = 7h). By

that, they took the risk of creating a steam explosion or cause a vessel rupture due to thermal shock. But none of this has happened, and at T = 3:45, the tank is again under water.

In quite incredible, it was not yet clear to operators that they were facing a LOCA (loss of coolant accident), that is to say, loss of water in the primary circuit .

They then tried to determine the temperature of the heart. There were a number of instruments for measuring temperature in the core, computer controlled. But the computer had been calibrated for measure temperatures below 700 degrees. Above, the computer did that printing of question marks. The software designers never imagined that a higher temperature than it would be reached.

Porter then used a multimeter to read the thermocouples directly. The measures he had corresponded to a temperature of about 10.000 degrees (note: a priori, considering the source, these are Fahrenheit. So, approximately 5,500 degrees Celsius) on a number of thermocouples of the heart. The technician simply could not believe his eyes. Porter himself was about to reject measures by considering thermocouples that were defective. But he then noted that temperatures near the center were higher than those on the sides. That's when they were sure that the heart was severely damaged and there was therefore a loss of fluid in the primary circuit.

They then alternated for several hours, water injection at high pressure and opening the valve of the primary circuit to gradually from the vapor bubble hole in it. The situation has stabilized and the coolant pumps were able to restore service to T = 3:49 p.m..

Leg Cramps During Tennis Play

Cervix Dilation Table

To Present To teach you how to count ... The Cabbage

Check Engine Gmc Yukon